When Parliaments Go to War: US War Powers in Comparative Perspective by Langland, Eric
www.ssoar.info
When Parliaments Go to War: US War Powers in
Comparative Perspective
Langland, Eric
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Langland, E. (2016). When Parliaments Go to War: US War Powers in Comparative Perspective. (DGAP kompakt,
2). Berlin: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V.. https://nbn-resolving.org/
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-54073-9
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
The terrorist attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015 
added new urgency to the discussion about defeating 
the Islamic State (ISIS). French President Francois Hol-
lande described the attacks as an “act of war” and sought 
assistance from its allies against ISIS in Syria through 
bilateral meetings and by invoking article 42.7 of the 
Lisbon Treaty – the mutual assistance clause.1 Heads of 
state were quick to pledge support, and the discussion 
soon turned to whether those pledges would be backed 
by their legislatures. Specifically, would British Prime 
Minister David Cameron, after being rebuked by parlia-
ment in 2013 for air strikes against the regime of Bashar 
al-Assad, ask parliament for the authority to strike ISIS in 
Syria? Would German Chancellor Angela Merkel, aware 
of her country’s discomfort with foreign military engage-
ments, request permission from the Bundestag to provide 
military support to the growing coalition against ISIS? 
And last, would US President Barack Obama, for a second 
time, ask Congress for a resolution authorizing force spe-
cifically against ISIS? 
In each case, France’s allies came to its aid, albeit in 
different ways. In Germany and the United Kingdom, the 
Bundestag and House of Commons quickly passed legisla-
tion authorizing a military operation against ISIS in Syria. 
In the United States, however, where the military was 
 already striking ISIS in Syria, a different story unfolded. 
In a December speech to the nation, President Obama 
urged Congress to pass new legislation authorizing the 
use of force against ISIS. Congress balked, and its leaders 
signaled that no such legislation would be brought to a 
vote with President Obama in the White House.2 As a re-
sult, the president continues to rely on a broad interpreta-
tion of his constitutional authority as commander-in-chief 
and a strained interpretation of past legislation authoriz-
ing force in the previous wars in Afghanistan and Iraq for 
the current military campaign in Syria.
This state of affairs is bad for two reasons. First, the 
president is operating under questionable legal authority. 
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are too distinct from the 
one against ISIS for the current military campaign to fall 
under those previous authorizations of military force, and 
the campaign is estimated to be too long and extensive 
to fall under what prior presidents have claimed as the 
commander-in-chief’s constitutional powers. This not only 
casts doubt on the legality of the current operations but 
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also creates an unhealthy precedent for future presidents 
to  interpret their war powers expansively. Second, a 
legislative mandate serves as a clear demonstration of 
public support. The American people are likely to support 
military action against terrorism but will not be eager to 
back another nation-building exercise. Properly debat-
ing the war against ISIS in Congress would allow for the 
proper restraints to be placed on the operation in terms 
of scope and time frame. In short, legislation authorizing 
the use of force against ISIS, like those passed in the UK 
and Germany, would demonstrate popular support and 
provide Congress with a critical opportunity to shape 
military policy.
To be sure, there are important differences in the sys-
tems of government – parliamentarian versus presidential. 
Prime ministers are elected by the legislatures and enjoy 
a legislative majority that presidents are not guaranteed. 
Nonetheless, all three democracies seek a strong legal 
underpinning and popular support when it comes to the 
use of military force.
This essay outlines the constitutional processes in each 
country for deploying the armed forces and highlights 
two important advantages from the experiences of 2015 
in the United Kingdom and Germany for US lawmakers 
to consider. First, the British vote to use military force il-
lustrated the importance of a public debate, even if such a 
debate and vote are not required by law under the British 
constitution. Second, the German vote demonstrates how 
the legislature can shape the military mission and leave 
the government on a strong legal footing for deploying 
the military. US democracy would benefit if its lawmakers 
heeded both examples.
The United Kingdom
Perhaps the most closely watched response to President 
Hollande’s call for support was that of Prime Minister 
David Cameron. In 2013 he had urged parliament to 
authorize air strikes against Bashar al-Assad’s regime 
in Syria in response to Assad’s use of chemical weapons. 
Stunningly, he was rejected.3 For the first time since 1782 
a prime minister had lost a vote to deploy the military.4 
But the vote was notable for another reason: nowhere in 
Britain’s unwritten constitutional tradition is the prime 
minister in fact required to seek parliament’s approval 
before authorizing military deployment.5 According to 
the Royal Prerogative, the prime minister has the sole 
authority to deploy British forces abroad.6 Historically, 
prime ministers have taken an unpredictable approach 
to bringing such votes before parliament, weighing the 
political risks and rewards.7 Yet in the context of his 2013 
defeat over chemical weapons, the decision to bring the 
December 2015 vote to parliament was seen by some as 
ushering a new political covenant into British politics.8 
On December 2, the House of Commons voted 397 to 223 
to authorize military action against ISIS in Syria.9 Within 
hours, Royal Air Force Tornado jets stationed in Cyprus 
struck targets in eastern Syria under ISIS control.
The British constitutional process
The UK is unique among its allies in that there is no law 
requiring the legislature to play a role in the war-making 
process – whether it be authorizing force beforehand or 
approving force afterward. But prime ministers often do 
seek parliamentary approval, as Tony Blair did with Iraq 
in 2003 and David Cameron did with Libya in 2011.10 In 
other cases, such as the campaigns in Afghanistan in 2001, 
Kosovo in 1999, the Gulf War in 1991, and the Falklands 
War in 1982, the prime minister did not seek approval 
from parliament.11
Despite Blair’s and Cameron’s recent overtures to 
parliament, prime ministers have been reluctant to en-
dorse a formal mechanism to require prior parliamentary 
approval. Several legislative proposals from the House 
of Lords and House of Commons have been considered 
to require prior parliamentary approval, but none have 
earned the support of the government.12 In British politics, 
consent of the Queen, who is advised by the government 
on such matters, is required to grant approval before a bill 
that challenges the Royal Prerogative can be debated and 
voted.13 Nonetheless, the British constitution is largely 
based on custom, and the 2015 vote to strike ISIS in Syria 
can be interpreted as another step toward creating a prec-
edent of prior parliamentary approval. 
Custom aside, Cameron’s decision was based on politi-
cal, not legal, considerations. Parliament was provided 
with two weeks’ notice, and on the day of the vote it 
debated for ten hours. After initial claims that Labour 
would vote as a party, leader Jeffrey Corbyn permitted 
Labour MPs to vote freely. Divisions arose between the 
minority leader and his party’s foreign policy spokesman, 
Hilary Benn, who gave an impassioned speech calling on 
his fellow members to stand once again against fascism. 
MPs opposed to the strikes questioned the effectiveness 
of an air campaign and expressed concern about civilian 
casualties. Divisions also arose within the Tory govern-
ment, but ultimately the measure passed with a strong 
majority.14 
This parliamentary debate exposed divisions within 
the UK on a foreign policy issue – an event governments 
strive to avoid in order to maintain the appearance of 
unity, decisiveness, and effectiveness on the world stage. 
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It had the advantage, however, of forcing lawmakers and 
their constituents to consider difficult questions about 
how to fight terrorism, contemplate the possibility of 
 civilian casualties, and provide support to allies, in addi-
tion to furthering a broader discussion about the UK’s role 
in the world. Not all of these questions were answered, 
but British forces can now operate in Syria knowing they 
do so with popular support.
Germany
Germany’s response to the Paris attacks provided yet 
another sign of its growing importance as a European 
and world leader. Chancellor Merkel pledged military 
support to President Hollande, and three weeks later the 
Bundestag voted to approve a military package, including 
Tornado reconnaissance aircraft, refueling aircraft, and 
a naval frigate with 1,200 non-combat troops to assist the 
French aircraft carrier.15 The Merkel government also 
agreed to send 650 peacekeepers to Mali in order to re-
lieve some pressure on the 1,500-strong French presence 
there, and to increase the number of German military 
personnel training Kurdish forces.16
Unlike the British system, German law requires the 
Bundestag to approve military operations before the 
chancellor can deploy forces.17 Political support for a mili-
tary deployment is therefore measured from the initial 
stages, and the mission is tailored to reflect the level of 
support. In fact, no German chancellor has ever lost a 
vote in parliament to authorize military action.18 Foreign 
Minister Frank Walter-Steinmeier captured this approach 
in remarks after the Paris attacks: “We are doing what 
is militarily necessary, what we can do best, and what 
we can back politically.”19 In a nation that seeks absolute 
moral clarity on issues of foreign military engagements, 
it is difficult to overstate the importance of political and 
legal certainty before sending its troops abroad.
The German constitutional process
Germany is an outlier among large NATO countries in its 
constitutional procedure for authorizing military deploy-
ments. Its distinguishing feature is parliamentary priority, 
a concept which precludes the chancellor from unilater-
ally deploying the military without prior approval from 
the Bundestag.20 Under the system, the chancellor submits 
a specific proposal to the Bundestag outlining the number 
of troops, duration, and scope of deployment.21 If the 
proposal passes with a majority vote, the Bundeswehr can 
deploy under those conditions. 
Because Germany’s constitution is silent on the matter 
of war powers, the concept of parliamentary priority owes 
its current existence to the Federal Constitutional Court.22 
Unlike courts in the US and UK, which avoid disputes 
between the executive and legislature over war powers, 
Germany’s highest court has issued a number of determi-
native rulings that form the current rules for deploying 
the military. Foremost among them was the court’s first 
decision pertaining to the Airborne Warning and Control 
System (The AWACS I Case, July 12, 1994), in which the 
court first examined whether membership in treaty orga-
nizations like the United Nations or NATO could provide a 
legal basis for the government to deploy forces outside the 
context of self-defense. In AWACS I, the parliamentary 
opposition challenged the government’s non-defensive 
operations in Kosovo, Somalia, and Bosnia. The court 
held that Article 24(2) of the German constitution, which 
permitted membership in collective defense organiza-
tions, provided legal grounds to deploy the military in 
order to uphold its international obligations. However, 
the court further held that the principle of parliamentary 
priority still existed and that the Bundestag must give its 
approval before the military is deployed.23
The Constitutional Court retreated slightly from its 
ruling in the years following AWACS I and deferred to 
the chancellor’s authority to deploy the Bundeswehr for 
operations it deemed “routine.”24 In 2008 the court reined 
in the government’s latitude to determine which deploy-
ments were routine and reaffirmed the principle of par-
liamentary priority with the AWACS II Case. In AWACS II, 
the opposition challenged the decision of Chancellor Ger-
hard Schröder’s government to deploy the Bundeswehr 
in an AWACS operation monitoring Turkish airspace after 
the invasion of Iraq. The government argued that the 
deployment was routine and for defensive purposes and 
therefore did not require a vote. The court sided with the 
opposition and held that, while the government has the 
ability to participate in the strategic direction of NATO, 
and even in decision making concerning specific deploy-
ments, the decision of when to deploy the Bundeswehr is 
only permissible with parliament’s approval.25
The Parliamentary Participation Act (PPA) of 2005 
codified the ruling in AWACS I, and the court’s decision 
in AWACS II closed a large loophole. The PPA provides a 
guideline for the government to draft proposals and out-
lines the rare exceptions where the chancellor can deploy 
forces without parliament’s approval.26 The result is a sys-
tem that may appear cumbersome from the outside, but a 
recent commission convened to review and recommend 
changes to the PPA found otherwise.27 Chaired by former 
Defense Minister Volker Rühe, the commission found 
that parliament was able to take decisions expeditiously, 
usually within two weeks of the government’s proposal, 
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and to pass authorizations with broad support that went 
beyond the majority groups forming the government. And 
that is precisely what happened with the December 2015 
vote to provide military assistance to the coalition fight-
ing ISIS in Syria. Only eight days after Chancellor Merkel 
submitted the proposal to the Bundestag, it voted 445 to 
146 in favor of assisting the coalition in Syria.28
The United States
Three weeks after the attacks in Paris, President Obama 
urged Congress to pass legislation authorizing the use of 
force against ISIS. This would, he claimed, “demonstrate 
that the American people are united, and committed to 
this fight.”29 Obama’s statement reflected a commonly 
held belief among American presidents: that the power to 
commit military forces abroad resides with the president 
and that any act of Congress is simply a symbolic demon-
stration of popular support. The idea of asking for support 
but not for approval is becoming a trend in the politics 
of American war powers.30 In 2013, Obama sought an 
Authorization for the Use of Force (AUMF) from Congress 
to strike Bashar al-Assad’s regime after its use of chemi-
cal weapons. Like Cameron in Britain, he was rebuffed. 
The Republican majority in the House of Representatives 
opposed the legislation, and the AUMF was never brought 
to the floor for a vote in either chamber. The president ul-
timately backed away from striking Assad regime targets. 
In early 2015, however, he sought another AUMF specifi-
cally for ISIS. Again he was rejected by the Republican-
dominated Congress. Despite these setbacks, the presi-
dent continued to authorize force against ISIS in Syria, 
Iraq, and Libya drawing on his inherent constitutional 
powers as well as the two previous AUMFs for the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.31 Two days after the attack in Paris, 
American jets continued airstrikes against ISIS in Syria, 
destroying large components of the ISIS oil network.
The American constitutional process
Article I of the US Constitution gives Congress the au-
thority to declare war and raise and support the armed 
forces.32 Article II provides that the president serves as 
commander-in-chief.33 In the post-WWII era, declara-
tions of war became outmoded, and presidents relied on 
their constitutional powers or congressional mandates 
to deploy the military.34 Then, in 1973, frustrated with 
the war in Vietnam, Congress passed the War Powers 
Resolution (WPR) over President Richard Nixon’s veto.35 
The WPR requires the president to deploy the military 
pursuant only to a declaration of war, specific statutory 
authorization, or a national emergency.36 An exception 
exists, however: the president can deploy troops without 
congressional approval for sixty to ninety days, after 
which the president must seek congressional approval to 
continue the military operation.37
In practice, the WPR has largely driven the legislative 
and executive branches of government further apart on 
the matter of war powers. Most presidents have rejected 
it as an unconstitutional infringement on the executive’s 
Article II powers.38 President Obama holds the view that 
in cases other than where Congress has specifically op-
posed military action, or where the nature, scope, and 
duration of operations would constitute a war, the execu-
tive has the authority under Article II to protect important 
national interests, including preserving regional stability, 
and supporting the UN Security Council’s credibility and 
effectiveness.39 Military actions like airstrikes in Libya or 
Syria do not meet these criteria. The Supreme Court has 
avoided the debate by citing different judicial doctrines, 
most notably the “political question” doctrine, a practice 
of deferring certain questions that the court sees as more 
fundamentally political than legal.40 
Since the WPR became law, presidents have often 
avoided confrontation with Congress by keeping mili-
tary deployments under the sixty-day mark.41 On other 
occasions, such as in Serbia and Kosovo, presidents have 
deployed the military without congressional approval on 
long-term, large-scale military operations under either 
UN or NATO banners.42 In the latter cases, Congress was 
ineffective in challenging the executive’s authority be-
cause it was unable to assemble a majority of legislators to 
pass a bill opposing the military action.43
The terrorist attacks against the United States on 
September 11, 2001 produced perhaps the greatest degree 
of consensus between the executive and legislative 
branches in the WPR era. Within three days of the attack, 
a draft AUMF passed Congress, and on September 18, the 
president signed it into law.44 The measure was unique in 
that, unlike previous AUMFs that limited military action 
to specific states or regions, it provided blanket authoriza-
tion for the president to “use all necessary and appropri-
ate force against those nations, organizations, or persons 
he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided 
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, 
or harbored such organizations or persons.”45 One year 
later, President George W. Bush sent another draft AUMF 
to Congress authorizing military force against Saddam 
Hussein’s regime in Iraq. Congress passed an AUMF for 
Iraq that authorized the president to “defend the national 
security of the United States against the continuing threat 
posed by Iraq; and enforce all relevant United Nations 
Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.”46
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More than a decade later, in pursuing the war against 
ISIS, President Obama first relied on his inherent powers 
as commander-in-chief under Article II of the constitution 
to conduct military operations. However, in September 
2014 the president began claiming legal authority to strike 
ISIS targets in Syria under the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs for 
Afghanistan and Iraq. He cited ideological and organiza-
tional ties between Al Qaeda and ISIS to draw a connec-
tion to the AUMF for Afghanistan. And he interpreted 
the AUMF for Iraq broadly as permitting the commander-
in-chief to defend threats to Iraq, meaning those coming 
from extraterritorial actors, in addition to threats coming 
from within.47 
Both interpretations have attracted considerable criti-
cism. Direct links between Al Qaeda and ISIS are difficult 
to establish, as Al Qaeda has publicly disavowed ISIS.48 
Reliance on the 2002 AUMF for Iraq is another logical 
stretch, as US troops were officially withdrawn from the 
country in 2011, full sovereignty was obstensibly re-estab-
lished, and the country democratically elected a govern-
ment.49 Under the president’s reading of both AUMFs, it is 
difficult to conceive of any Islamic militant group – or any 
group posing a threat to Iraq – that would not fall under 
those legislative authorizations.
From a constitutional standpoint, the president’s 
expansive interpretation of his constitutional powers and 
of the scope of the Iraq and Afghanistan AUMFs will set 
precedents for future executives to follow. With contin-
ued deference from the Supreme Court and passivity from 
Congress, these precedents will serve to greatly enhance 
the president’s war powers. Legal questions concern-
ing the executive’s authority will persist. Politically, a 
democratic deficit has emerged. By failing to debate the 
war against ISIS, important questions about commitment, 
time, cost, and scope are left unanswered. In compari-
son to its allies, the US democratic process for going to 
war  possesses neither the political backing of the British 
 system nor the legal backing of the German one.
Conclusion
A crisis can call attention to a government’s strengths 
or expose its weaknesses. The November 2015 terrorist 
attacks in Paris underlined the relatively smooth political 
processes by which the United Kingdom and Germany 
deploy their military forces. The constitutional process 
by which the US deploys its forces, however, is broken. 
The combination of congressional inaction and dilittante 
executive interpretations of existing authorities have left 
the US military operating in Syria with neither a clear 
political mandate nor a legal one. 
The US Congress should take a cue from Great Britain 
and bring to a vote an Authorization for the Use of Force 
in Syria. Only this will impart appropriate legitimacy to 
military action there against ISIS. Multiple drafts from 
members of Congress and the president already exist. 
Furthermore, the president should look to Germany as 
an example for how to incorporate the legislature early in 
the decision-making process and to achieve a resolution 
that stands up to legal scrutiny. The fight against ISIS will 
produce a high number of casualties. Democracy and rule 
of law in the US should not be among them.
Eric Langland was a Robert Bosch Transatlantic Fellow at 
the DGAP from October 2015 through January 2016. He 
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